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Abstract 
In the last two decades, airline alliances were not only successful in extending the size of their 
networks, but also received approvals by public authorities to intensify their cooperation up to 
merger-like revenue-sharing joint ventures (JVs). We empirically investigate the impact of the 
implementation of such joint ventures on both the respective airlines’ network structure and their 
productive efficiency. Using U.S. DOT T100 International Segment data and applying airline-
market fixed effects models, we find that joint ventures – compared to services with a lower degree 
of cooperation – lead to a 3-5 percent increase in seat capacity between the respective partner 
airlines’ hub airports; however, this is done at the expense of services elsewhere in the network. 
Productive efficiency, as measured by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower for joint 
venture routes compared to routes operated under antitrust immunity only. We use our empirical 
results to discuss implications for the balancing of competition and cooperation in transatlantic 
airline markets. 
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1 Introduction 
Although there is hardly any doubt among economists that competition is a key driver of the wealth 
of nations, it is equally undisputed that cooperation between firms has the potential to generate 
substantial increases in economic welfare. For example, the pooling of (partly) complementary 
resources as part of research and development activities can not only reduce the fixed cost burden 
to society, but might also lead to quicker and/or better research outputs and (subsequently) 
improved products and services. However, although cooperation between firms can surely increase 
welfare, researchers have also identified forms of firm cooperation (e.g., price fixing or market 
sharing arrangements) that are likely to have detrimental welfare effects.  
The existence of both costs and benefits of firm cooperation immediately suggests the importance 
of the question of the optimal degree of cooperation to maximize economic welfare. The 
transatlantic airline market renders itself very well to such an investigation. Cooperation between 
the airlines on this market has been in place for over two decades, and it has taken various forms. 
At this time, partnerships on transatlantic routes range from ad hoc codesharing agreements via 
partnerships covered by antitrust immunity up to revenue-sharing merger-like joint ventures (JVs). 
Airline joint ventures are a recent phenomenon, and effects of this new form of airline cooperation 
has not received much attention in the academic literature.  
Our study is therefore the first empirical examination of the effects of airline joint ventures. Policy 
makers have approved ever tighter coordination between the airlines taking into account the 
previously realized benefits of alliances with antitrust immunity, but potentially without paying 
due regard to the potential anti-competitive effects of such agreements. The key contribution of 
our work is therefore to provide empirical evidence of the effects of JVs with the hope of giving 
the authorities the information for future evidence-based policy-making. 
Against this background, we empirically investigate the impact of the implementation of airline 
revenue-sharing joint ventures (JVs) on both the respective airlines’ network structure and their 
productive efficiency. The focus of our empirical investigation is on the JV-specific effects on (a) 
flight frequency; (b) passenger numbers; and (c) flight load factors – our proxy for efficiency. Our 
investigation employs panel data analysis techniques, similar to those used in the literature 
(including our own previous work on related questions). 
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Using U.S. DOT T100 International Segment data and applying airline-market fixed effects 
models, we find strong and robust evidence that joint ventures – compared to services with a lower 
degree of cooperation – lead to a 3-5 percent increase in seat capacity between the respective 
partner airlines’ hub airports; however, this happens at the expense of services elsewhere in the 
network. Productive efficiency, as measured by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower for 
joint venture routes compared to routes operated under antitrust immunity only. We use our 
empirical results to discuss implications for the balancing of competition and cooperation in 
transatlantic airline markets.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general high-level 
description of the balancing of competition and cooperation in joint ventures. The subsequent 
Section 3 applies the general theories and concepts to the case of airline alliances. After a general 
introduction to the development of airline alliances in Section 3.1, Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the general economic effects of such agreements as discussed in the existing literature. 
Section 4 presents our empirical analysis. While Section 4.1 provides a detailed description of the 
construction of the data set and the descriptive statistics, Section 4.2 continues with the 
characterization of our methodological approach. Section 4.3 closes the section with the 
presentation and discussion of our empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2 Balancing competition and cooperation in joint ventures 
The general question of balancing competition and cooperation is closely connected to the 
determinants of firm boundaries, discussed extensively in the economics and business strategy 
literature over the last couple of decades. Differentiating between horizontal and vertical 
boundaries of the firm, cost considerations are typically presumed to be one important determinant 
of the former. With respect to the vertical boundaries, theoretical and empirical research has 
demonstrated the importance of the balance between investment incentives (specific assets) and 
performance incentives (Cabral, 2000). These incentives determine the efficient degree of 
cooperation; that is, the degree which minimizes the sum of production and transaction cost. 
In addition to the two polar options of ‘market’ and ‘integration’, several hybrid organizational 
forms have emerged to reach the desired efficient solution for organizing economic activities (see 
Bilotkach and Hüschelrath, 2011 for a general discussion). Strategic alliances and joint ventures 
(JVs) can be interpreted as two available options for the optimization of a firm’s horizontal and 
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vertical organizational structure. Limiting our further discussions to particularly joint ventures1, 
they generally occur when two or more firms pool some of their resources within a common legal 
organization (Kogut, 1988). The theoretical rationales for forming joint ventures rather than 
entering into regular contracts include transaction costs savings, strategic behavior, and 
capitalizing on the organizational knowledge. The former of the three rationales is well in line with 
the traditional Stiglerian boundaries of the firm argument; the second relates to longer-term profit 
maximization; and the latter views joint ventures as a means by which the firms learn or retain 
their capabilities (Kogut, 1988). Some researchers also noted that the alliance structure can be 
determined by the social networks within which the firm is embedded (Gulati, 1998). 
Shapiro and Willig (1990) point to the following potential benefits of joint ventures. First, joint 
ventures can be a mechanism for effective risk sharing in an uncertain environment. Second, they 
help the firms realize cost savings due to either the complementary nature of their products or 
economies of scale and scope. Third, Barney (2002) reminds that joint ventures can be used as a 
vehicle to facilitate tacit collusion among the partner firms (in related markets), thereby increasing 
market power and profits. Fourth, joint ventures can help the firms to enter new markets, industries, 
or industry segments.  
The empirical literature on joint ventures in economics and management mostly deals with 
evaluations of the realization of such benefits. For instance, Chan et al. (1997) and Koh and 
Venkatraman (1991) find a positive effect of alliances and joint ventures on stock prices. 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) and Kotabe and Swan (1995) examine new product development 
facilitated by alliances. However, the potential (private and/or social) benefits of such agreements 
have to be traded off against the potential costs. For example, when partners’ goals differ, joint 
ventures may exacerbate the situation and hurt rather than help the parties involved. Also, Shapiro 
and Willig (1990) point to the potential for free riding by the venture partners as another possible 
problem associated with joint ventures. Furthermore, Walker (2004) identifies reduced control 
                                                          
1  The business strategy literature does not provide a clear definition and delineation of strategic alliances and joint 
ventures. Barney (2002), for example, subdivides ‘strategic alliances’ into non-equity alliances, equity alliances, 
and joint ventures. The key difference between the latter and the former two is that only a joint venture leads to 
the creation of a legally independent new corporation in which the parent companies hold shares. Following this 
delineation, airline alliances must typically be categorized as ‘non-equity alliances’ rather than ‘joint ventures’. 
However, in the remainder of this paper we follow the majority of the literature and use the term ‘joint venture’ 
for (revenue-sharing) airline alliances. In fact, both terms can be considered interchangeable, as both organizational 
forms are similar in their motivations and economic effects.  
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over decision making, strategic inflexibility, weaker organizational identity of the participating 
companies, and potential conflicts with antitrust law as additional disadvantages of cooperation 
among firms in general and joint ventures in particular. In fact, existing antitrust laws must be 
considered as key potential constraint of cooperation in transatlantic airline market as it will be 
shown in the following section.  
3 Competition and cooperation in transatlantic airline markets 
3.1 The development of airline alliances 
Commercial scheduled passenger transportation deals with moving people and their luggage from 
point A to point B. The production process is rather complex and involves many aspects such as 
ticketing, luggage handling, passenger catering, fueling, air traffic control, and aircraft 
maintenance. The airlines differ in many ways, from pricing policies, over the fleet mix to the 
degree to which they choose to vertically integrate the various parts of the production process. Yet, 
there is one thing in common for all the carriers: no single airline’s network encompasses all 
possible “point A to point B” combinations. This fact forces many passengers to ‘interline’ or 
change an airline during their journey. 
Given these specifics of air transport, the early forms of cooperation between the airlines on 
deregulated markets have appeared as a way to tackle this interlining problem more efficiently, 
making the ‘joint’ product more attractive to the customer as compared to other possible interlining 
options. At the perhaps most primitive level, the passenger would be more attracted to an interline 
service – other things equal and assuming no on-line service is available – which allows him/her 
to check the luggage through to the final destination, thus not having to worry about the checked 
bags beyond the customs requirements. The web of interlining agreements gradually gave rise to 
international airline alliances, even though numerous inter-alliance and out-of-alliance ad hoc 
partnerships to facilitate interline travel still exist. The three global alliances – SkyTeam, Star, and 
oneworld – currently carry about 75 percent of all passengers on the global market. 
An advanced form of cooperation among airlines is called codesharing. Codesharing refers to 
including an airline’s flights into the partner airlines’ schedules. Thus, an airline via a codesharing 
arrangement is able to enlarge its network without having to service additional flights. Moreover, 
it can sell tickets for the interline flight as its own. The early forms of airline alliances in the late 
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1990s were guided by the codesharing principle, often complemented by agreements to jointly use 
airport facilities (e.g., gates). Additionally, sharing of customer loyalty (i.e., frequent flier) 
programs was very common (see generally Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011, 2012) for detailed 
discussions).  
A further degree of cooperation is reached if the alliance partners enter into some form of joint 
price setting arrangements that typically also imply a joint coordination of scheduling (i.e. 
departure times and flight frequencies). Given the price fixing nature of such agreements, antitrust 
laws typically prohibit the implementation of this kind of joint venture. Granting of antitrust 
immunity is therefore a precondition for an implementation of such agreements. 
Limiting ourselves to U.S. enforcement actions with respect to transatlantic airline alliances, the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) as responsible public authority eventually approved – 
referring to the transatlantic market only – a total of 13 applications from core members of 
SkyTeam (from 19952 to 20013) and Star alliances (from 19964 to 20055). However, applications 
of the core oneworld alliance members – American Airlines and British Airways – in 19976 and 
20017 were unsuccessful due to the dominant role of both airlines at London’s Heathrow airport 
and key transatlantic city-pair markets, including London-New York, London-Chicago and 
London-Miami routes.  
The most complete form of cooperation allowed under the current regulatory constraints is the 
establishment of a merger-like revenue-sharing joint venture. As part of such an agreement, the 
partner airlines are pooling revenues and costs of their operations (and/or share profit) thereby 
leading to a merger-like cooperation, in which the partners are indifferent as to which of them is 
actually carrying a particular passenger (so-called ‘metal neutrality’). The first attempt to receive 
approval for such an extensive agreement was undertaken by the core SkyTeam (Delta-Air France) 
and Wings (Northwest-KLM) partnerships in 20048. Based on fears that the close cooperation on 
international markets might have spillover effects on domestic competition, the DOT first denied 
                                                          
2  DOT-OST-1995-618 (Delta, Swissair, Sabena, Austrian). 
3  DOT-OST-2001-10429 (Delta, Air France, Alitalia, Czech). 
4  DOT-OST-1996-1116 (United, Lufthansa). 
5  DOT-OST-2005-22922 (United, Austrian, bmi, LOT, Lufthansa, SAS, Swiss, TAP). 
6  DOT-OST-1997-2058 (American, British Airways). 
7  DOT-OST-2001-10387 (American, British Airways). 
8  DOT-OST-2004-19214 (Delta, Northwest, Air France, KLM, Alitalia, Czech). 
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approval for the enlarged SkyTeam alliance.9 Anticipating the introduction of the U.S.-EU Open 
Aviation Area agreement and promoting the concept of metal-neutrality (which refers to the 
practice of revenue and cost pooling within the alliance), SkyTeam reapplied in 200710 and the 
DOT decided in May 200811 to approve the application as “… the proposed alliance is consistent 
with the public interest, will produce public benefits, and will not substantially reduce 
competition”. Subsequently, in July 2009 12  and July 2010 13 , the core members of Star and 
oneworld alliances were given approval to implement their respective revenue-sharing joint 
venture agreements. However, all approvals were subject to certain conditions (partly) including 
carve-outs (see Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011) for a detailed discussion).  
Before we turn to a discussion of the economic effects of airline alliances in general and revenue-
sharing joint ventures in particular, the identified existence of several degrees of airline 
cooperation raises the question of their relevance in practice. Figure 1 therefore provides the 
passenger-based shares of the three major route categories – no immunity / immunity without JV 
/ JV – on the transatlantic market between 2007 and 2013. 
  
                                                          
9  DOT-OST-2004-19214 (Final Order), Order 2006-2-1 (Feb. 6, 2006). Other reasons to deny the initial request for 
antitrust immunity were the potential reduction of competitive pressures in gateway-to-gateway markets and the 
foreclosure of competitor’s access to alliance hubs.  
10  DOT-OST-2007-28644 (Delta, Northwest, Air France, KLM, Alitalia, Czech). 
11  DOT-OST-2007-28644 (Final Order), Order 2008-5-32 (May 22, 2008). 
12  DOT-OST-2008-0234 (United, Austrian, bmi, LOT, Lufthansa, SAS, Swiss, TAP, Air Canada, Brussels, 
Continental). 
13  DOT-OST-2008-0252 (American, British Airways, Iberia, Finnair). 
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Figure 1: Passenger-based shares of different route categories 
Source: own calculations based on DOT T100 data 
As shown in Figure 1, the share of passengers traveling on JV routes increased dramatically from 
zero percent in 2007 to about 78 percent in 2011 mirroring the granting of transatlantic JVs in 
2008 to SkyTeam, 2009 to Star and 2010 to oneworld. The share of immunity routes outside of 
JVs decreased accordingly from about 56 percent in 2007 to less than 10 percent in 2013. A 
comparable but less pronounced trend is found for routes on which neither immunity nor a joint 
venture form of cooperation was implemented. The share decreased from about 44 percent in 2007 
to about 26 percent in 2010 to a rather stable share of about 15 percent since 2011. 
3.2 Economic effects of airline alliances 
A number of studies, both theoretical and empirical, evaluate the economic effects of international 
airline partnerships (see generally Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011, 2013)). Theoretical models 
of international airline consolidation include studies by Oum, Park and Zhang (1996), Park (1997), 
Brueckner (2001), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Heimer and Shy (2006), Bilotkach (2005, 2007a, 
2007b), Barla and Constantatos (2006), Chen and Gayle (2007) and Flores-Fillol and Moner-
Colonques (2007). Most of these studies analyze motives for and effects of a single airline alliance, 
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outside of the broader context.14 Of the above cited papers, the issue of competition between 
alliances is considered by Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Bilotkach (2005), and Flores-Fillol and 
Moner-Colonques (2007). The general conclusion from those studies is that airline consolidation 
benefits interline passengers due to the complementary nature of the product and the removal of 
double marginalization. However, as soon as consolidation decreases competition, consumers may 
lose depending on the relative sizes of the cost-saving effect and the market power effect. Note 
that theoretical studies have focused mostly on price effects of the airline partnerships. Effects on 
passenger volumes were automatically realized through the law of demand (i.e., the lower the price, 
the higher the volume). Some models include economies of traffic density, but they do not 
explicitly model load factor effects. 
In the most recent survey paper, Bilotkach (forthcoming) notes that the theoretical models of 
airline partnerships do suffer from a number of shortcomings, and suggests some avenues for 
further research on the topic. Fageda et al. (forthcoming) presents the first theoretical analysis that 
incorporates joint ventures. In their work, joint ventures are modelled as cost-sharing rather than 
revenue-sharing partnerships, which simplifies the matter quite a bit. 
Generally, the size of the cost-saving effect is influenced to a great extent by the realized benefits 
of higher traffic due to cooperation between airlines reflected in the so-called economies of traffic 
density15 (i.e. falling average cost with higher load factors). Furthermore, airline alliances are 
expected to realize further alliance-specific efficiencies due to cost reductions via shared back 
office functions, maintenance facilities and operational staff as well as joint marketing advantages 
of the integrated frequent flyer programs. These incremental advantages for consumers need to be 
traded off against the market power effect of airline consolidation. This effect is basically driven 
by the possibility that airline alliances might eliminate horizontal intra-alliance competition, 
thereby causing higher fares and a reduced choice on certain routes (see, e.g., Reitzes and Moss, 
2008). The existence and magnitude of the market power effect is dependent on various 
                                                          
14  Despite the various modeling approaches of airline alliances in recent years, most attempts in the literature fail to 
differentiate between joint ventures and mergers between airlines. Alliances are also often found to be profitable 
for individual airlines. Sometimes such a conclusion comes with caveats: e.g., Bilotkach (2005), as well as Flores-
Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007) suggest setups where alliance formation can be an outcome of a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma type of setting, where each pair of potential partners is individually better off outside of an alliance, but 
can increase profits by forming a partnership, provided the other pair remains unallied. 
15  For instance, Brueckner and Spiller (1994), found that a 10 percent traffic increase led to a 3.75 percent reduction 
in marginal costs. 
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competition parameters. For example, as argued by Oum et al. (2000)16 the degree of overlap 
between the respective networks is typically a key determinant because the higher the overlap, the 
more severe are the competition concerns and the more likely are price increases as a consequence 
of cooperation. Furthermore, the participating airlines may use alliances to reduce competitive 
pressures by facilitating collusive behavior or restricting entry through the implementation of 
foreclosure strategies. 
Empirical analyses of the effects of international airline alliances have been offered by Oum et al. 
(1996), Park and Zhang (2000), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2003), Whalen (2007) 
and Bilotkach (2007c). 17  All of these papers confirm that airline alliances benefit interline 
passengers by offering lower fares. Park and Zhang also find evidence for increasing market power 
of the alliance members at their hubs, even though they suggest that this effect is offset by the cost 
savings that the alliance brings about. While finding that alliances decrease interline fares, 
Brueckner and Whalen (2000) fail to observe a statistically significant increase in fares due to 
airline consolidation where such appears to decrease the number of competitors.  
In general, the consensus of research on the economic effects of airline alliances is that interline 
partnerships benefit consumers thanks to the removal of double marginalization and economies of 
traffic density. These benefits might partly come in the form of lower ticket prices, but might also 
include higher flight frequency, more destinations within easy reach, or shorter travel times. All 
these factors tend to have a stimulating effect on demand and traffic growth. However, what need 
to be investigated closer in the following are the relative costs and benefits of several degrees of 
cooperation between airlines. In particular, an understanding needs to be developed whether, first, 
the granting of antitrust immunity and, second, the approval of full-fledged revenue-sharing joint 
ventures, are compulsory to realize the key benefits for the consumers to the fullest extent, or 
                                                          
16  Oum et al. (2000) classify alliances into ‘complementary’ and ‘parallel’ ones. While complementary alliances – 
i.e., the networks of the alliance partners largely feed traffic to each other – are likely to reduce fares, parallel 
alliances – i.e., the networks of the alliance partners partly overlap and competition on these routes is reduced – 
are likely to increase fares. 
17  There is also an older set of empirical papers available which study the effects of airline alliances on airline costs, 
revenues or profits, passenger traffic, passenger fares, and convenience and service quality. However, given the 
significant changes in the degree of cooperation among airlines we omit a detailed discussion of the results here 
(see generally Button and Drexler (2006) and Morrish and Hamilton (2002) for overviews).  
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whether lower degrees of cooperation can reach comparable benefits levels (while avoiding the 
incremental costs). 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Construction of the data set and descriptive statistics 
Our main source of data is the T100 International Segment dataset, provided by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. This dataset is essentially a census of all non-stop commercial 
international flights performed to and from the United States. The data are aggregated at the month-
route-operating-carrier-aircraft-type level. Each entry contains information about the segment’s 
endpoints, operating carrier, and monthly totals for the number of departures performed, seats 
offered, and passengers carried on this particular segment. This information naturally allows us to 
compute the flights’ load factors, also aggregated at the carrier-route-month level.  
We have set up the sample for our data analysis in the following way. From our main dataset, we 
have selected data for travel between the U.S. and all current EU members, plus Switzerland and 
Norway, for the years 2007 up to (and including) 2013. We have retained only passenger services, 
aggregated the data to the month-route-operating-carrier level (pooling together the data for 
services by the same airline between the same endpoints, performed on aircraft of different types), 
and removed directionality from the data (i.e., we pooled British Airways’ London Heathrow to 
New York JFK airport flights together with the same carrier’s flights in the opposite direction). To 
make sure our analysis remains focused on the market for scheduled commercial passenger 
services, we have eliminated services with fewer than thirty monthly departures18. We have further 
restricted our sample to services performed by the ‘legacy’ carriers; these include mostly EU 
countries’ traditional flag carriers19 and major U.S. airlines. In this way, we eliminate services by 
smaller and charter carriers, as well as by the airlines from other parts of the world (mostly Asian 
carriers) performing transatlantic services under the fifth freedom rights20. All these restrictions 
                                                          
18  Since we removed directionality, this means that we have only retained services that are operated at least as 
frequently as 3-4 times per week in every direction. 
19  Other European carriers with significant scheduled passenger services include airlines such as Virgin Atlantic, Air 
Berlin, and Norwegian. 
20 Fifth freedom rights allow the airline to carry revenue passengers between foreign countries as part of the service 
to/from its own country (e.g., under the fifth freedom right Air India is allowed to carry London-New York 
passengers on the respective segment of its New Delhi–London–New York service). 
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left us with nearly 17,000 airline-market-month level observations for 385 airline-market 
combinations on 263 non-directional airport-pair markets. 
The transatlantic joint ventures have added another dimension to the transatlantic market structure. 
We have quite naturally created the corresponding JV indicator variable, tying it to the date of the 
venture’s approval, and assuming the venture became operational the month after such approval 
has been obtained. Specifically, the JV variable takes on the value of 1 for the following services: 
- Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, KLM, and Air France services after May 2008; 
- Lufthansa, United Airlines, and Continental Airlines services after July 2009; 
- American Airlines, British Airways, and Iberia services after July 2010. 
We also need to account for the two major mergers between the U.S. carriers, which occurred 
during the time period covered by our data, and directly relate to the joint ventures. Delta and 
Northwest merged in 2008, and in 2010 United merged with Continental. Following the 
consolidation events the airlines retained the Delta and United brands. However, due to the time it 
takes for the airlines to officially merge their operating certificates, the Northwest and Continental 
flights continued showing up in the data for at least a year after the merger has been approved. We 
have therefore re-coded Northwest observations after October 2008 as Delta Air Lines’ services. 
Similarly, all Continental Airlines’ flights after September 2010 have been recoded as United 
Airlines’ services. The two dates correspond to the approval of the respective mergers by the U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
Aiming at studying the effects of antitrust immunity and joint ventures, we have followed our 
previous work (Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013)) and created the following independent variables, 
corresponding to the be types of airline services, defined according to both the airline’s 
membership in an alliance enjoying antitrust immunity, and the endpoints’ status as a hub in one 
or the other airline’s network. Referring to Figure 2 below, airports S1, H1, and H2 are assumed 
to be located across the Atlantic Ocean from H3, H4, and S2. The partnership between the airlines 
operating hubs H1 and H3 is called alliance 1, while alliance 2 consists of the airlines operating 
hubs H2 and H4.  
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Figure 2: Simple network with two alliances 
Source: Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013) 
 
Given this set-up, we can differentiate between the following types of international markets: 
- Immunized alliance members’ services between their respective hub airports (H1-H3 and 
H2-H4 routes; e.g., KLM service from Amsterdam to Detroit, or Delta Air Lines and Air 
France flights between Paris and Atlanta); we will call those “Alliance services between 
immunized hubs”. In the specifications we will estimate, this category will be denoted via 
the indicator variable 𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
. 
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to a hub airport of a 
competing alliance with antitrust immunity (H1-H4 and H2-H3 routes; e.g., KLM service 
from Amsterdam to Chicago O’Hare, or Delta Air Lines services from this carrier’s hub to 
Frankfurt); to be denoted “Alliance services between competitors’ hubs”. The 
corresponding notation is 𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
. 
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to airports which do not 
serve as hubs for any immunized alliance member (S1-H3, S1-H4, S2-H1 and S2-H2 routes; 
e.g., KLM service from Amsterdam to Boston, or Lufthansa flights from Frankfurt to such 
airports as Phoenix, Boston, or Seattle); we will refer to those as “Other immunized alliance 
services”, and denote the corresponding indicator variable 𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
. 
- Services to immunized alliance members’ hub airports by airlines which are themselves 
not immunized alliance members (H3-X route; e.g., British Airways services to airports 
such as Chicago O’Hare or Denver before British Airways obtained immunity, or 
H1 
H2 
H3 
H4 
S1 
S2 
Alliance 1 
Alliance 2 
X 
Outside carrier 
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Continental Airlines or U.S. Airways' services to the respective EU hubs, such as Paris, 
Amsterdam, or Frankfurt). This category will be called “Other services to alliance hubs”. 
The notation we will use is 𝐼𝑇𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
. 
Altogether, the above-defined four categories of markets represent all possible direct services 
to/from the hub airports of members of airline alliances with antitrust immunity. The baseline 
category will include all the services (by all the airlines) outside of the hub airports of the alliance 
members with immunity – i.e., services elsewhere on the network. We will ultimately disentangle 
the effects of joint ventures from antitrust immunity by using the interaction dummy variables 
involving the JV indicator variable we introduced previously and the airline-route-specific 
dummies above. Interestingly, the four categories above cover all the services involving the 
transatlantic joint venture partners. Services that involve antitrust immunity but not covered by a 
joint venture include all the immune services before the JV was granted (remember that our data 
starts from 2007, and the last JV was approved in 2010), as well as the services by immunized 
alliance partners not covered by the JV grant (i.e., the non-core alliance members, such as Finnair, 
Alitalia, Czech Airlines, or LOT Polish Airlines). 
Hub airports have been designated based on the structure of the airlines’ networks. EU airlines’ 
hubs mostly correspond to the respective countries’ capitals (except for Lufthansa, which operates 
hubs at both Frankfurt and Munich airports; Alitalia, using both Rome Fuimicino and Milan 
Malpensa as hubs21; and SAS, operating hubs at Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Oslo). For the U.S. 
airlines participating in airline partnerships with antitrust immunity, we have designated the 
following airports as hubs: 
- American Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Ft. Worth, Miami 
- United Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Denver, San Francisco, Washington Dulles 
- Northwest Airlines: Detroit, Minneapolis, Memphis. 
- Delta Air Lines: Atlanta, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City, New York JFK 
- Continental Airlines: Newark and Houston. 
                                                          
21  In 2008, Alitalia opted for a single-hub strategy, gradually moving all its transatlantic services into Rome. 
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Following the Delta-Northwest and United-Continental mergers, we designated Northwest and 
Continental hub airports as Delta and United hubs, respectively. 
The key dependent variables we will be using are the number of passengers, seats, flight frequency, 
and the load factor. All the observations represent monthly airline-route level totals (for the first 
three variables) or averages (for the load factor). Of the four measures, load factor is the closest 
measure of efficiency we can obtain from publicly available data. 
Additionally, our specifications will include an airport-market-level passenger-based Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, geometric average real GDP per capita for the US metropolitan area and the 
corresponding EU country, and the trade volume between the U.S. and the respective European 
country. Table 1 below includes the conventional descriptive statistics for our key variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
Frequency 75.42 47.15 30 532 
Passengers 15,556 11,486 477 135,149 
Seats 19,108 13,824 992  157,922 
Load factor 0.8093 0.0987 0.1197 0.9877 
Control variables 
HHI 0.7410 0.2668 0.2509 1 
Trade volume (annual, million US$) 78,438 44,580 1,692 161,706 
Average real GDP per capita, EUR, 
2010 prices 
34,235 4,464 15,144 51,009 
Key variables 
Joint venture 0.5059 0.4999 0 1 
Route classification dummies 
Between immunized hubs 0.2222 0.4157 0 1 
Other immunized alliance services 0.2671 0.3674 0 1 
Between competitors' hubs 0.2141 0.4102 0 1 
Other services to immunized hubs 0.1608 0.3674 0 1 
 
Table 1 shows that on average a service on the transatlantic market involves an airline flying a bit 
more often than twice per day using a smaller sized wide-body aircraft (the average aircraft size 
in our sample is about 250 seats, roughly corresponding to the capacity of a Boeing 767 in the 
usual two-class configuration). About half of our observations correspond to the services by the 
partner airlines covered by the joint venture.  
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Table 2 demonstrates that over the years covered by our data about half of all the passengers have 
been carried on the joint venture services. However, we can also see that by 2013 the share of 
passengers carried by joint venture flights on the transatlantic market has exceeded 75 percent, 
increasing in jumps as the three JVs have been approved in 2008 to 2010.  
Table 2: Total passenger volumes depending on alliance relationships 
Year No Immunity Immunity without JV JV All 
2007 20,664,339 26,349,654 --- 47,013,993 
2008 20,735,955 18,526,190 8,636,166 47,898,311 
2009 18,110,593 9,099,327 17,642,297 44,852,217 
2010 11,731,344 3,925,622 29,688,732 45,345,698 
2011 7,293,634 2,908,733 37,108,899 47,311,266 
2012 7,486,906 3,010,547 36,810,313 47,307,766 
2013 7,956,158 3,278,286 37,223,818 48,458,262 
2007-2013 93,978,929 67,098,359 167,110,225 328,187,513 
As first rough look at the effects of antitrust immunity and joint ventures on efficiency, Table 3 
presents descriptive statistics on the average load factors for services covered by the joint ventures, 
immunity without joint ventures, as well as the flights not covered by antitrust immunity. 
Considering passenger load factor as a measure of productive efficiency, we see from this Table 
that initially JVs have led to higher load factors as compared to routes that were covered by 
antitrust immunity, but not included into the joint ventures. These benefits appear to have 
dissipated over time, and in 2013 the average load factor on the few remaining routes covered by 
antitrust immunity (but not included into JVs) is virtually the same as that on many markets 
covered by the transatlantic joint ventures. Our empirical analysis in the following section will 
account for market and airline heterogeneity, and include conventional control variables.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for load factor depending on alliance relationships 
Year  No Immunity Immunity without JV JV All 
2007 
Mean 0.7633 0.8180 --- 0.7850 
St.Dev 0.1503 0.0859 --- 0.1314 
2008 
Mean 0.7511 0.7999 0.8081 0.7734 
St.Dev 0.1492 0.0957 0.0981 0.1316 
2009 
Mean 0.7606 0.7768 0.8203 0.7836 
St.Dev 0.1469 0.1362 0.1113 0.1366 
2010 
Mean 0.7951 0.8052 0.8258 0.8128 
St.Dev 0.1395 0.1047 0.0880 0.1119 
2011 
Mean 0.7923 0.7907 0.8057 0.8008 
St.Dev 0.1466 0.1278 0.1051 0.1202 
2012 
Mean 0.7908 0.8317 0.8261 0.8162 
St.Dev 0.1491 0.0942 0.0997 0.1171 
2013 
Mean 0.7916 0.8360 0.8375 0.8232 
St.Dev 0.1476 0.0976 0.0930 0.1149 
2007-2013 
Mean 0.7720 0.8068 0.8221 0.7982 
St.Dev 0.1485 0.1031 0.0995 0.1254 
4.2 Methodological approach 
The goal of our data analysis is to evaluate whether JVs have changed the respective airlines’ 
network structure as well as (productive) efficiency in comparison to the services with antitrust 
immunity but not covered by the joint ventures. When performing the data analysis, it is important 
to keep in mind the structure of the partner airlines’ joint networks, as changes in the network 
flows might reflect changes in the market players’ competitive strategies, and ultimately consumer 
welfare. For instance, the JV partners might prioritize services between their hub airports over 
offering more flights elsewhere in their joint networks (e.g., SkyTeam partners might add flights 
between Atlanta and Paris instead of offering a non-stop Atlanta-Berlin flight, channeling the 
traffic on the latter market via Paris, depriving the customers of the non-stop flight option). 
Our estimation techniques of choice are airline-market fixed effects. The hub-and-spoke network 
structure operated by the major players on the transatlantic market implies, among other things, 
that flight frequency decisions, especially on spoke-hub routes, are not driven by spoke-hub 
demand, but by demand on various spoke-spoke markets, going through the hub. To deal with this 
problem, we follow Bilotkach (2011) as well as Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), and estimate 
an airline-airport-pair-market fixed-effects model. Additionally, we also follow Bilotkach and 
Hüschelrath (2013) in treating market concentration as potentially endogenous. We deal with this 
issue by instrumenting the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the market-level passenger volume, 
lagged six months (this is the same instrument as used in the above-cited paper). 
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To address the potential autocorrelation issue (which is likely present due to the fact that the 
airlines’ schedules are somewhat rigid), we estimate a dynamic panel data model where the lagged 
dependent variable is introduced as a right-hand side regressor. Yet, dynamic panel data models 
can result in biased coefficient estimates due to the obvious endogeneity in the lagged dependent 
variable. In order to address this endogeneity threat, we will employ the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel data. Specifically, we will use the system estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) which built on and improved the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator. System GMM analysis is specifically designed to address endogeneity issues 
with dynamic panel data models (i.e., biases in the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent 
variable). We determined that the dynamic panel data GMM technique we employ produces valid 
estimates when the first four lags of dependent variable are included on the right-hand side, and 
all further lags are used to construct the instruments. 
Our data analysis will be based on the following specifications: 
log(𝑌𝑖𝑗) = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼3𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑇𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
and 
log(𝑌𝑖𝑗) = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝐼𝐽𝑉(𝛾1𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛾2𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛾3𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛾4𝐼𝑇𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 )
+ 𝐼𝑁𝑜𝐽𝑉
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒(𝛿1𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛿2𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛿3𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛿4𝐼𝑇𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 )
+ 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
Where: 
 Yij is flight frequency, number of seats, passengers, or load factor of airline i on market j; 
 X is the vector of control variables, as discussed in the previous section of the paper; 
 Indicator variables 𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
; 𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑢𝑏
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
; 𝐼𝐻𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
; and IToImmuneHub
NoImmunity
 represent the four 
key categories of services, also defined above; 
 𝐼𝐽𝑉 and 𝐼𝑁𝑜𝐽𝑉
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒 are the indicator variables for services of the joint venture partners, as well as 
the services of immunized alliance members not covered by joint ventures, respectively. 
These two specifications will be implemented using the airline-market fixed effects model, as 
discussed earlier in this section. The dynamic panel data GMM specifications will also include 
lagged dependent variables. The former specification is essentially similar to that used by 
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Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013). We however include fewer control variables, due to both data 
availability and lack of within-variation in some of the variables included into our previous work22. 
The latter specification modifies the former one by postulating different effects depending on 
whether or not the partner airlines operating under antitrust immunity are also members of a 
transatlantic (revenue-sharing) joint venture. 
The focus of our data analysis exercise is twofold. First, by simply applying the data analysis 
conducted in Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), we will be able to check whether the relationships 
discovered in that study are also present under the new institutional structure on the transatlantic 
market. Second, we aim at examining whether joint venture partners develop their network 
differently from the partner airlines that enjoy antitrust immunity, but are not part of the joint 
ventures. 
As a reminder, Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013) found that antitrust immunity leads to the partner 
airlines increasing traffic between their hubs, and also from their hubs to non-hub airports. Results 
for the effect of antitrust immunity on traffic to the hub airports of the airlines that participate in 
competing alliances with immunity varied across sub-samples. Notably, that study discovered that 
antitrust immunity led to reduction in passenger traffic by the airlines, which were not themselves 
members of immunized partnerships, to the hub airports of carriers covered by immunity. This 
result was interpreted as being consistent with market foreclosure. 
As for the analysis of differences between services included into and not covered by the 
transatlantic joint ventures, our focus will be on the differences between 𝛾𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖 coefficients. 
The null hypotheses will naturally be that the joint ventures have not had any effect on the partners’ 
network structure strategies or productive efficiency (as proxied by the load factor), that is 
𝛾𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖;  𝑖 = 1,4̅̅ ̅̅ . If JV is indeed the closest arrangement to the full-scale merger, possible under 
the current regulatory and institutional framework on the transatlantic market, we can expect the 
partner airlines to increase traffic on the routes between their hub airports, facilitating interline 
connections. Bilotkach et al. (2013), examining network reorganization following the Delta-
Northwest merger, concluded that the two airlines have re-organized their network to prioritize 
                                                          
22  For instance, no new Open Skies Agreements have been signed over the time period covered by our data, and no 
new countries have joined the Visa Waiver Program. 
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their largest hubs. An interesting question then is whether any increase in traffic between the joint 
venture partners’ hubs will be at the expense of the rest of the network. 
Last but not least, our analysis has to take into account an important difference between the three 
major alliances. Specifically, as discussed in Section 3.1 above, while both SkyTeam and Star 
alliances have been cooperating under antitrust immunity arrangements for a good number of years 
before approval of their respective joint venture application, this is not the case for the oneworld 
alliance. Until approval of the JV involving key oneworld alliance partners in July 2010, the only 
working antitrust arrangement within this alliance covered American Airlines and Finnair 
services23. Thus, the American Airlines-British Airways-Iberia partnership status changed from 
codeshare without immunity straight to joint venture (skipping the intermediate ‘immunity without 
the joint venture’ state). We can therefore suspect approval of the joint venture for the AA-BA 
partnership might not have led to the same sort of network restructuring and changes in partner 
airlines relationships as for the JVs covering SkyTeam and Star alliances.  
We decided to approach this issue by adding an additional robustness check. Namely, we reran 
our regressions treating American-British-Iberia services following approval of their joint venture 
as services covered by antitrust immunity but excluded from the joint venture. If the approval of 
the oneworld joint venture has indeed led the partner airlines to restructure their network in the 
same way as done by SkyTeam and Star alliances, then the reclassification of oneworld services 
will diminish the magnitude of any JV-specific effects. Otherwise, the JV effects will become 
more pronounced, suggesting that it does take time for the partner firms to establish close 
relationships, and the way the alliance ends up working does not necessarily depend on the 
freedoms the partners obtain from the public authority.  
4.3 Empirical results and discussion 
Results of our data analysis are presented in Tables 4 to 9. Specifically, Table 4 reports the 
outcomes of specifications, similar to those employed in Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013). Tables 
5 and 6 show the estimates of the effects of joint ventures in the airline-market fixed effects model 
context. The dynamic panel data GMM results are included in Tables 7 and 8. Tables 5-8 include 
results for both the entire sample, as well as for the sub-sample of what we call “stable” services, 
                                                          
23  Interestingly, the American-Finnair partnership was not covered by the JV rights granted to oneworld partners. 
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or airline-market combinations, which appear in our dataset for at least 50 months. In this exercise, 
we have assumed that services changing their operating carrier following a merger (e.g., 
Continental Airlines’ services operated by United after these two carriers merged) or as a result of 
a joint venture (e.g., services reassigned to a partner airline under the “metal neutrality” 
arrangements) were continuations of the previously operated routes rather than the new services. 
In this way, we aspire to reduce the possibility of seasonal, new, and/or discontinued services 
affecting our results.  
Finally, Table 9 reports the fixed effects model results for the alternative treatment of oneworld 
alliance services. As a reminder, we have decided to recode flights by this alliance partners 
following approval of the respective JV as those covered by antitrust immunity, but not by joint 
venture arrangements. Such treatment is precipitated by the fact that, unlike SkyTeam and Star 
alliance partners, oneworld partners have had very limited experience operating under antitrust 
immunity prior to obtaining JV rights. 
Table 4, when compared to the results reported by Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), reveals a 
number of substantial changes on the transatlantic market in the age of joint ventures. Specifically, 
our previous research has demonstrated that granting of antitrust immunity has led to the partner 
airlines increasing service frequency and passenger volumes on all the routes within their network 
(with the possible exception of routes between the competing alliance members’ hubs, where no 
robust relationship has been established). We also showed that airlines excluded from alliances 
have reduced their passenger numbers and flight frequency to hub airports of the alliance members 
– we interpreted this evidence as being consistent with market foreclosure. 
Our data analysis this time demonstrates that antitrust immunity leads to lower frequency, seats, 
and passenger traffic, as compared to the baseline category, with one notable exception: partner 
airlines with immunity (recall that in Table 4 we do not make distinction between immunized 
services within and outside of JVs) increase traffic on routes between their hub airports. The 
magnitude of this effect is, however, smaller than what we have reported in our previous paper. 
Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013) indicated that gaining antitrust immunity leads to up to 20 
percent higher passenger volumes on routes between the partner airlines’ hubs. According to Table 
4, the magnitude of this effect is now only 7.1-7.7 percent.  
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We do, however, find that services operated by partner airlines with antitrust immunity are 
characterized by higher load factors (an indicator of increased productive efficiency). Compared 
to our previous work, the magnitude of this effect has declined substantially for services between 
partner airlines’ hub airports (from nearly 10 percent to less than 2 percent), and increased 
somewhat for other services by the immunized carriers. Last but not least, we now observe no 
evidence consistent with market foreclosure. This could be the sign of either a market in 
equilibrium (with, for instance, immunized alliance members occupying the role of the dominant 
firm, and outside of alliance airlines being established fringe), or immunized carriers being more 
accommodating of the services of outside of alliance airlines. Also, most of the within-variation 
in this variable over the time period covered by our study comes from services to and from London 
Heathrow airport. Services into this airport do not generally require beyond-gateway traffic (i.e., 
passengers continuing their journeys beyond London) to be sustainable. However, this issue is 
outside of the scope of this paper.  
Looking at our main results – those relating to the changes specific to joint ventures – we can say 
the following. First, the fixed effects and dynamic panel data GMM estimates are nearly the same 
qualitatively (with the exception of the effect of JVs on passenger volumes on routes between the 
alliance partner hubs). Quantitatively, dynamic panel data GMM suggests smaller differences 
between joint ventures and services covered by the antitrust immunity, but excluded from JVs. 
Also, treating oneworld joint venture services as those not covered by the joint ventures does not 
change the results qualitatively, but in most cases points to modest increases in the magnitude of 
the JV effects. 
The main takeaway message from our analysis is that the only clear and robust effect of joint 
ventures as compared to the immunized services that are not part of the JVs is the increase in seat 
capacity between the respective partner airlines’ hub airports. Moreover, this increase appears to 
happen at the expense of services elsewhere within the respective networks. Specifically, our 
results indicate that joint ventures lead to an increase in the number of seat capacity on routes 
between hub airports of the respective partner airlines (by 3-5 percent, depending on the estimation 
methodology). There is however no robust evidence to conclude that JV partners actually increase 
flight frequency or passenger volumes on the same routes, as compared to the situation before 
approval of transatlantic joint ventures. We do see robust evidence of lower traffic on routes 
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between hub airports of competing JV hubs (such as, for instance, Atlanta-Frankfurt or London-
San Francisco markets). Compared to other immunized services, joint venture partners offer 3-5 
percent fewer seats, 1.5-5 percent fewer flights, and carry 1.5-11 percent fewer passengers24 on 
those routes. Also, joint venture partners carry 2.5-5 percent fewer passengers, and offer 1.6-4.3 
percent fewer seats and 1-4.3 percent fewer flights on routes from their hubs to other airports (e.g., 
Amsterdam-Los Angeles, Frankfurt-Philadelphia, or Newark-Edinburgh markets).  
Investigation of the effect of joint ventures on flight load factors shows the following: load factors 
on flights covered by antitrust immunity tend to be higher than in the baseline category, indicating 
that immunity does allow the partner carriers to better fill up their flights. However, at the same 
time, we also find that joint ventures lead to the partner airlines reducing their load factors 
throughout the joint network by 0.5-5 percent. It is thus clear that JVs do not appear to yield 
(productive) efficiency benefits in this dimension. Although admittedly speculative, a possible 
explanation for the observed effect would be an increase in market power of the respective 
alliances (suggesting price increases for transatlantic flights). 
Last but not least, let us discuss what our results (which are based on analysis of the data for non-
stop transatlantic segments) could mean for implications of JVs for competition on the transatlantic 
markets. Within the general transatlantic airline network, we can, following the approach in the 
literature, distinguish gateway-to-gateway, beyond-the-gateway-to-gateway, and beyond-the-
gateway-behind-the-gateway markets. The former markets are of course those where non-stop 
flights are available. The second category of markets include city-pairs that can be reached with 
one stop (for instance, Newcastle – Los Angeles or Tucson – Amsterdam markets). As there are 
currently no non-stop transatlantic flights from either Newcastle or Tucson, in the former case a 
passenger would have to transfer at a European hub, and in the latter he/she will travel via a U.S. 
hub airport. The last category of markets involves on both sides of the ocean cities without any 
non-stop transatlantic flights originating at them. Newcastle – Tucson would be an example of 
such a market. 
Our results suggest a stronger position of JV partner airlines on markets between their hubs and 
reduced capacity on other gateway-to-gateway markets involving JV hubs. Translating these 
                                                          
24  The lower estimates of the effect of JVs on passenger volumes come from dynamic panel data GMM models, 
while fixed effects models suggest much higher effects. 
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capacity changes into price effects might not be a straightforward matter. On the one hand, 
increased capacity of JV airlines on the markets between the partners’ hubs should increase the 
respective airlines’ market share, potentially leading to softer competition and higher prices. On 
the other hand, on those routes where JV partners are the only players, prices may decrease. JV 
partners will also obtain a more dominant position on beyond-the-gateway-to-gateway markets. 
Consider the Amsterdam-Tucson route. One-stop travel between the two cities is possible via 
Atlanta (a SkyTeam hub), Houston (Star Alliance) or Chicago (oneworld), among others. Our 
results suggest that capacity will be increased only on the Amsterdam-Atlanta segment, but not on 
Amsterdam-Chicago or Amsterdam-Houston flights. This implies a stronger market position of 
SkyTeam JV, other things equal. Note that this result mirrors the findings of Bilotkach and 
Hüschelrath (2013).  
Joint ventures could actually spell good news for customers traveling on behind-the-gateway-
beyond the gateway routes. Travel on such markets usually includes a flight segment between hubs 
of JV partner airlines. For instance, typical itineraries on the Tucson – Newcastle route could be 
Tucson-Atlanta-Amsterdam-Newcastle with SkyTeam JV or Tucson-Chicago-London-Newcastle 
with oneworld (Star Alliance offers limited convenient travel options on this market, mostly 
because Newcastle is not as well connected to European hubs of this alliance). We have shown 
that joint ventures will lead to increased capacity on both Atlanta-Amsterdam and Chicago-
London (for American Airlines’ and British Airways’ flights) segments. This in turn can yield 
fiercer competition on such beyond-to-behind markets between SkyTeam and oneworld joint 
ventures (leaving multimarket contact considerations outside of this simple thought experiment). 
5 Conclusion 
In the last two decades, the three (currently remaining) airline alliances – Star, SkyTeam and 
oneworld – were not only successful in extending the size of their networks by attracting new 
members, but also received approvals by public authorities to successively intensify their 
cooperation. What started in the 1990s as small and rather simple code-sharing agreements 
between pairs of carriers later was extended to (already far-reaching) joint price-setting and 
scheduling agreements (demanding the granting of antitrust immunity by the responsible public 
authorities) and – most recently – the founding of revenue- and profit-sharing joint ventures that 
aim at mimicking full-fledged mergers to the largest degree possible under the existing regulatory 
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constraints. In approving the respective extensions of the alliances, the responsible public 
authorities aimed at balancing competition and cooperation in a way that the difference between 
public cooperation benefits and possible costs in the form of reductions in competition is 
maximized.  
As the merger-like revenue-sharing joint ventures of the core members of SkyTeam, Star and 
oneworld were approved by the U.S. Department of Transportation in 2008, 2009 and 2010, 
respectively, a sufficient amount of time has now passed to empirically study their impact on both 
the respective airlines’ network structure as well as productive efficiency. Using U.S. DOT T100 
International Segment data and applying airline-market fixed effects models, we find that joint 
ventures – compared to services with a lower degree of cooperation – lead to an increase in seat 
capacity between the respective partner airlines’ hub airports by 3-5 percent; however, this appears 
to occur at the expense of services elsewhere in the network. Productive efficiency, as measured 
by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower for joint venture services, as compared to 
services operated under antitrust immunity only. We further suggest that such changes could lead 
to softer competition on all markets involving JV partners’ hub airports, while competition on 
beyond-the-gateway-to-behind-the-gateway routes can intensify. Analysis of price effects of JVs 
would be an interesting next step, subject to data availability25. 
One important caveat of our findings is that the impact of joint ventures on the load factors variable 
can be subject to different interpretations. We claim throughout this study that load factors are a 
proxy for efficiency although, in principle, lower load factors could simply be the outcome of 
increased market power of joint ventures: JVs could use their market power to increase the airfares, 
translating into fewer tickets sold and lower load factors, other things equal. This could happen 
regardless of what happens to productive efficiency following establishment of the joint ventures. 
We have to note, however, that this interpretation also does not imply good news for the traveling 
public. 
Although analysis of this kind will be highly speculative at present, it would be interesting to 
model potential effects of full-scale inter-continental airline mergers. We realize that such 
arrangements are not feasible in the current regulatory environment (due to foreign ownership 
                                                          
25 Price data for itineraries flown by non-US carriers are currently unavailable to the general public. 
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restrictions on both sides of the Atlantic). More importantly, studies on the effects of mergers tend 
to focus on the price impact (e.g., Peters, 2006; Kwoka and Shumilkina, 2010). Even though 
studies on the impact of airline mergers on the non-price product characteristics are also available 
(e.g., Bilotkach, 2011; Hueschelrath and Mueller, 2015; Bilotkach et al., 2013), it is not clear 
whether and to what extent results of those works can be directly transferred to the transatlantic 
market (or long-haul routes in general). 
Although our empirical analysis is unable to isolate significant (incremental) benefits of revenue-
sharing joint ventures, far-reaching conclusions such as the termination of such joint ventures – or 
even the end of airline cooperation under antitrust immunity – should be handled with great care. 
First, our empirical results show a higher efficiency (as measured by load factors) for flights under 
antitrust immunity compared to simple code-sharing flights, suggesting measurable benefits of 
higher degrees of airline cooperation. Second, it is important to remark that our analysis is limited 
to several quantity and efficiency-related measures, leaving the potential price and (cost) efficiency 
effects of different degrees of airline cooperation outside the scope of the study. However, such 
analyses appear to be compulsory before definite conclusions on the welfare effects of especially 
revenue-sharing joint ventures can be drawn.  
Third, although several years have gone by since the formation of merger-like airline joint ventures, 
it appears likely that the respective partner airlines continue to optimize their respective networks 
possibly generating additional consumer benefits in the future. Last but not least, our study only 
provides limited insights into the workability of competition between the three remaining alliances 
in transatlantic markets. Although limited in scope (due to, e.g., the dominance of particular 
alliances at particular hubs), the respective pressures created by inter-alliance competition might 
be strong enough to sufficiently discipline the pricing behavior of airline alliances thereby 
increasing consumer welfare. 
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Annex 
Table 4: Fixed effects results without joint venture variables 
 
Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) Log(Load Factor) Log(Frequency) 
All All All All 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0332** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0016 
(0.0079) 
0.0315** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0349** 
(0.0074) 
Between competing 
hubs 
-0.0816** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0536** 
(0.0120) 
0.0279** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0407** 
(0.0107) 
Between own hubs 
0.0589** 
(0.0114) 
0.0763** 
(0.0121) 
0.0174** 
(0.0058) 
0.0255** 
(0.0104) 
Other to immune hub 
-2.3E-05 
(0.0095) 
0.0078 
(0.0095) 
0.0079 
(0.0070) 
0.0055 
(0.0077) 
Log(HHI) 
-0.1224** 
(0.0441) 
-0.1633** 
(0.0484) 
-0.0039 
(0.0222) 
-0.0531 
(0.0378) 
Log(Trade) 
-0.0457* 
(0.0250) 
0.0272 
(0.0262) 
0.0730** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0176 
(0.0221) 
Log(Average GDP per 
capita) 
0.1559* 
(0.0858) 
-0.2763** 
(0.0899) 
-0.4323** 
(0.0395) 
-0.0957 
(0.0719) 
Observations 16946 16946 16946 16946 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8991 0.9017 0.5978 0.8727 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
0.5389 0.6262 1.0178 0.4291 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
3. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 5: Main results – Seats and passengers, fixed effects 
 
Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) 
All Stable All Stable 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0437** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0477** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0189** 
(0.0084) 
-0.0230** 
(0.0087) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0844** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0988** 
(0.0128) 
-0.0715** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0912** 
(0.0132) 
Between own hubs 
0.0647** 
(0.0117) 
0.0650** 
(0.0126) 
0.0701** 
(0.0125) 
0.0650** 
(0.0135) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0057 
(0.0108) 
-0.0099 
(0.0114) 
0.0282** 
(0.0112) 
0.0242** 
(0.0118) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0487** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0548** 
(0.0145) 
0.0124 
(0.0138) 
-0.0090 
(0.0147) 
Between own hubs 
0.0312** 
(0.0142) 
0.0280* 
(0.0150) 
0.0731** 
(0.0156) 
0.0656** 
(0.0164) 
Other to immune hub 
0.0007 
(0.0096) 
-0.0034 
(0.0098) 
0.0019 
(0.0097) 
-0.0064 
(0.0098) 
Log(HHI) 
-0.1238** 
(0.0440) 
-0.1460** 
(0.0452) 
-0.1682** 
(0.0483) 
-0.1656** 
(0.0493) 
Log(Trade) 
-0.0542** 
(0.0250) 
-0.0939** 
(0.0280) 
0.0108 
(0.0262) 
-0.0295 
(0.0295) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 
0.1506** 
(0.0871) 
0.1548** 
(0.0952) 
-0.2037** 
(0.0910) 
-0.2440** 
(0.0991) 
Observations 16946 13714 16946 13714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8993 0.8831 0.9021 0.8864 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.5490 0.5128 0.6289 0.5795 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
3. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 6: Main results – Frequency and load factor, fixed effects 
 
Log(Load Factor) Log(Frequency) 
All Stable All Stable 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0248** 
(0.0039) 
0.0248** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0417** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0465** 
(0.0081) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0129** 
(0.0062) 
0.0075 
(0.0065) 
-0.0454** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0596** 
(0.0117) 
Between own hubs 
0.0053 
(0.0059) 
-6.6E-05 
(0.0062) 
0.0245** 
(0.0107) 
0.0217* 
(0.0117) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0340** 
(0.0054) 
0.0341** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0215** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0242** 
(0.0107) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0612** 
(0.0086) 
0.0457** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0198* 
(0.0114) 
-0.0292** 
(0.0120) 
Between own hubs 
0.0419** 
(0.0069) 
0.0332** 
(0.0072) 
0.0248** 
(0.0131) 
0.0169 
(0.0139) 
Other to immune hub 
0.0011 
(0.0069) 
-0.0030 
(0.0070) 
0.0038 
(0.0079) 
-0.0007 
(0.0081) 
Log(HHI) 
-0.0443** 
(0.0221) 
-0.0205 
(0.0208) 
-0.0544 
(0.0378) 
-0.0596 
(0.0389) 
Log(Trade) 
0.0650** 
(0.0104) 
0.0644** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0231 
(0.0222) 
-0.0545** 
(0.0251) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 
-0.3543** 
(0.0393) 
-0.3988** 
(0.0431) 
-0.0734 
(0.0729) 
-0.1144 
(0.0795) 
Observations 16946 13714 16946 13714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6014 0.5798 0.8727 0.8680 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.0267 1.0003 0.5838 0.5438 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
3. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 7: Main results – Seats and passengers, dynamic panel data GMM 
 
Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) 
All Stable All Stable 
Lagged dependent, first lag 
0.3494** 
(0.0009) 
0.4752** 
(0.0011) 
0.3685** 
(0.0012) 
0.4821** 
(0.0044) 
Lagged dependent, second lag 
0.0126** 
(0.0007) 
0.0385** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0006) 
0.0110** 
(0.0032) 
Lagged dependent, third lag 
0.0239** 
(0.0003) 
0.0046** 
(0.0006) 
0.0237** 
(0.0005) 
0.0103** 
(0.0034) 
Lagged dependent, fourth lag 
-0.0284** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0834** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0228** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0842** 
(0.0028) 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0163** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0272** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0102** 
(0.0052) 
0.0324 
(0.0330) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0334** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0488** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0412** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0159 
(0.0376) 
Between own hubs 
0.0539** 
(0.0094) 
0.0412** 
(0.0079) 
0.0484** 
(0.0062) 
0.1063** 
(0.0450) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0102 
(0.0083) 
-0.0090 
(0.0063) 
0.0150** 
(0.0067) 
0.0592* 
(0.0368) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0186 
(0.0152) 
-0.0299** 
(0.0107) 
0.0162** 
(0.0084) 
0.0313 
(0.0381) 
Between own hubs 
0.0082 
(0.0171) 
0.0118 
(0.0088) 
0.0416** 
(0.0112) 
0.1055** 
(0.0386) 
Other to immune hub 
0.0120** 
(0.0053) 
0.0031 
(0.0051) 
0.0018 
(0.0054) 
0.0075 
(0.0200) 
Log(HHI) 
-0.0082 
(0.0079) 
-0.0192 
(0.0122) 
0.0123** 
(0.0050) 
0.0415 
(0.0461) 
Log(Trade) 
-0.0463 
(0.0350) 
-0.0743 
(0.0580) 
-0.0138 
(0.0222) 
-0.0471 
(0.0595) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 
0.1323** 
(0.0612) 
0.1067 
(0.0821) 
-0.1832** 
(0.0894) 
-0.0901 
(0.0843) 
Observations 16591 13509 16591 13509 
Hansen J-Statistic 
(p-value) 
486 
(0.4474) 
205 
(0.5652) 
367 
(0.7130) 
218 
(0.3204) 
Notes:  
1. Model employed – dynamic panel data GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with airline-market fixed effects 
and lagged market level passenger volume used as instrument for HHI.  
2. Year and month fixed effects included in all regressions, but not reported.  
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors reported in parentheses.  
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 8: Main results – Frequency and load factor, dynamic panel data GMM 
 
Log(Load Factor) Log(Frequency) 
All Stable All Stable 
Lagged dependent, first lag 
0.4049** 
(0.0010) 
0.4448** 
(0.0017) 
0.3091** 
(0.0002) 
0.4288** 
(0.0043) 
Lagged dependent, second lag 
0.0266** 
(0.0016) 
0.0174** 
(0.0020) 
0.0085** 
(0.0001) 
0.0380** 
(0.0009) 
Lagged dependent, third lag 
0.0116** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0031** 
(0.0012) 
0.0187** 
(0.0001) 
0.0027** 
(0.0009) 
Lagged dependent, fourth lag 
-0.0211** 
(0.0008) 
0.0034** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0337** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0862** 
(0.0012) 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0094** 
(0.0023) 
0.0106** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0170 
(0.0383) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0013 
(0.0019) 
0.0041* 
(0.0022) 
-0.0290** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0304 
(0.0402) 
Between own hubs 
-0.0035 
(0.0036) 
-0.0001 
(0.0036) 
0.0195** 
(0.0010) 
0.0145 
(0.0448) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0154** 
(0.0025) 
0.0162** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0198** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0036 
(0.0402) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0362** 
(0.0027) 
0.0356** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0155** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0129 
(0.0265) 
Between own hubs 
0.0268** 
(0.0037) 
0.0247** 
(0.0034) 
0.0178** 
(0.0024) 
0.0151 
(0.0439) 
Other to immune hub 
-0.0036** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0018 
(0.0014) 
0.0056** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0041 
(0.0124) 
Log(HHI) 
0.0124** 
(0.0023) 
0.0116** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
0.0040 
(0.0124) 
Log(Trade) 
0.0354** 
(0.0178) 
0.0337** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0184 
(0.0124) 
-0.0419 
(0.0236) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 
-0.2312** 
(0.0512) 
-0.2116** 
(0.0675) 
-0.0564 
(0.0734) 
-0.0532 
(0.0633) 
Observations 16591 13509 16591 13509 
Hansen J-Statistic 
(p-value) 
364 
(0.7260) 
379 
(0.8091) 
371 
(0.6737) 
285 
(0.2538) 
Notes:  
1. Model employed – dynamic panel data GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with airline-market fixed effects 
and lagged market level passenger volume used as instrument for HHI.  
2. Year and month fixed effects included in all regressions, but not reported.  
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors reported in parentheses.  
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 9: Results with reassigned oneworld services, fixed effects 
 Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) Log(Frequency) Log(Load Factor) 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0738** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0512** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0704** 
(0.0082) 
0.0226** 
(0.0044) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.1200** 
(0.0136) 
-0.1180** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0765** 
(0.0127) 
0.0019 
(0.0065) 
Between own hubs 
0.0824** 
(0.0130) 
0.0781** 
(0.0139) 
0.0232** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0042 
(0.0066) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0196** 
(0.0087) 
0.0059 
(0.0089) 
-0.0256** 
(0.0082) 
0.0256** 
(0.0045) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0569** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0136 
(0.0119) 
-0.0216** 
(0.0099) 
0.0433** 
(0.0074) 
Between own hubs 
0.0445** 
(0.0119) 
0.0609** 
(0.0128) 
0.0188* 
(0.0109) 
0.0161** 
(0.0059) 
Other to immune hub 
-0.0019 
(0.0095) 
0.0030 
(0.0095) 
0.0023 
(0.0078) 
-0.0049 
(0.0069) 
Log(HHI) 
-0.1091** 
(0.0437) 
-0.1458** 
(0.0480) 
-0.0429 
(0.0377) 
-0.0367 
(0.0221) 
Log(Trade) 
-0.0485 
(0.0251) 
0.0235 
(0.0264) 
-0.0184 
(0.0222) 
0.0720** 
(0.0104) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 
0.1464** 
(0.0881) 
-0.2329** 
(0.0919) 
-0.0612 
(0.0732) 
-0.3794** 
(0.0398) 
Observations 16946 16946 16946 16946 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8997 0.9026 0.8731 0.6020 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.5510 0.6322 0.5857 1.0287 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Compared to the results reported in Tables 5-8, JV variable here excludes oneworld services covered by the 
respective joint venture. Such services are instead included into the Immunity without JV variable. 
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
4. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
5. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
 
